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FEDERAL SUPPORT OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING: NOT
QUITE WHAT LBJ HAD IN MIND
By Chris Johnson
On November 7, 1967, President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed the Public Broadcasting Act1 into
law and established the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting ("CPB"), a nonprofit corporation
responsible for distributing the annual federal ap-
propriation for public broadcasting. 2 Senator
Claiborne Pell touted the newly enacted legisla-
tion and the corporation it established as placing
"the voice of the American people in a productive
relationship to the great medium of television."
3
Congress declared in the Act itself that "it furthers
the general welfare to encourage public telecom-
munications services which will be responsive to
the interests of people both in particular localities
and throughout the United States, which will con-
stitute an expression of diversity and excellence.
'" 4
In signing the bill, President Johnson remarked
that the Act's purpose was to "enrich man's
spirit"5 and "give a wider and stronger voice to ed-
ucational radio and television by providing new
funds for broadcast facilities."' 6 Furthermore, Pres-
ident Johnson announced his enthusiasm for
CPB, describing it as an institution that would "as-
sist stations and broadcasters who aim for the best
in broadcasting: good music, exciting plays, re-
ports on the whole fascinating range of human ac-
tivity."7 Johnson predicted that public broadcast-
ing would "try to prove that what educates can
also be exciting."8 More importantly, Johnson also
I Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81
Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)).
2 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(3)(A)(i)-(iv) (setting out the re-
quirements for how the annual appropriation for the Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting is to be distributed).
3 113 CONG. REc. 31587 (1967).
4 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5).





stated that the Corporation would get "part of its
support from the government" but "be carefully
guarded from government or party control," "be
free and independent," and belong "to all the
[American] people."9
However, recent developments demonstrate
that public broadcasting has found itself suc-
cumbing to political party control, calling into
question whether public broadcasting is com-
pletely free and independent and whether it be-
longs to all the American people. The public is
left wondering whether public broadcasting is
truly an expression of diversity."1 For example, in
a hearing before the House Commerce Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Telecommunications in
July 1999, Subcommittee Chairman William
Tauzin (R-La.) revealed that a rather significant
number of public broadcasting stations had
rented donor lists to the Clinton-Gore election
campaign, violating a federal tax law that prevents
nonprofit groups from participating in political
activities. 11 CPB subsequently conducted a survey
of the 75 largest public television stations and
found that more than one-third had exchanged
member or donor lists with political groups and
roughly more than forty percent rented lists from
political groups. 1 2
Public Broadcasting System ("PBS") President
Ervin Duggan resigned less than two months after
I 0 See, e.g., Paul Farhi, WETA's Political Name-Swapping; Ex-
change of Donor Lists with Democrats Angers GOP, WASH. POST,
July 16, 1999, at Cl; Paul Farhi, WETA to Drop Political Lists,
WASH. POST, July 17, 1999, at Cl; Public Broadcasting Stupidity,
WASH. POST, July 20, 1999, at A18; Swapping of Donor Lists by
Public TV Decried, WASH. POST, July 21, 1999, at A4; George F.
Will, Who Needs Public Broadcasting?, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
1999, at B7; TV Column, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1999, at C7.
I' See PBS Stations Rented Clinton Donor Lists, WASH. POST,
July 31, 1999, at C7.
12 See Steve Behrens, CPB Bans List Dealings with Politicos,
CURRENT, Aug. 2, 1999, at 1, 10 & 19.
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the list-swapping scandal broke. Although other
factors may have contributed to his resignation,
Duggan likely was embarrassed after he explained
to Congress that thirty public stations had shared
their membership lists with political groups.1"
Conservative critics of public broadcasting con-
demned the list-swapping practices as further evi-
dence of public broadcasting's liberal bias. 14 Fur-
ther concern over the matter in Congress
prompted the proposal of a bill known as the Pub-
lic Broadcasting Donor Privacy Act of 1999,15
designed to prevent public broadcasting stations
from sharing their donor lists with any other or-
ganization. The bill proposes to deny funding or
assistance from CPB to any public broadcast sta-
tion that "may make available any list, in whole or
in part, of the financial contributors to such sta-
tion to any person or other entity."'16
CPB President Bob Coonrod reacted to Con-
gress's concerns by introducing a resolution ad-
dressing the issue, which the CPB Board of Direc-
tors passed unanimously. 17 The resolution
required all stations receiving a CPB grant to
maintain active control and complete records of
all uses of their membership and donor lists; offer
all donors a means to have their names sup-
pressed from their lists; not sell or release donor
names to any candidate for public office, political
parties or organizations supporting a candidate,
and certify compliance in regards to their tax-ex-
empt status, political activity and lobbying.' In
addition, Coonrod sent an open memo to all pub-
lic radio and television station managers urging
them to ensure that their stations do not trade
member and donor lists with political parties in
the interests of respecting the privacy concerns of
members and donors."1
It is clear that the public broadcasting of today
is not quite what President Johnson had in mind
1'3 See Lisa de Moraes, PBS Executive Ervin Duggan Finds an
Open Door Out, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1999, at Cl. The Public
Broadcasting System ("PBS") is a private, nonprofit organiza-
tion that distributes television programming to the member
stations. It receives no direct government appropriations,
although it does receive substantial grants every year from
CPB. See CORPORArION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING, 1998 AN-
NUAL REPORr 7, 28, 43, 46, 55, 58 (1999) [hereinafter CPB
ANNUAL REPORT].
14 See Moraes, supra note 13, at Cl.
15 Public Broadcasting Donor Privacy Act, H.R. 2791,
106th Cong. (1999). This bill is currently being debated in
House subcommittee. Up-to-date status of the bill can be
found on the Library of Congress's Thomas website,
<thomas.loc.gov>.
when he signed the Public Broadcasting Act into
law over thirty years ago. This comment proposes
that public broadcasting is currently subject to
government and party control. First, this com-
ment will discuss the history behind the passage of
the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 ("1967 Act")
and the creation of the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting ("CPB"). Next, through the descrip-
tion and evaluation of past and recent events in
Parts II and III, this comment will show that fed-
eral support for public radio and television has
not had the effect that President Johnson or the
90th Congress intended and will demonstrate that
federal support for public broadcasting has in fact
produced undesirable side effects contrary to the
policies underlying the 1967 Act. Additionally,
Parts II and III will assert that public broadcasting
is currently a product of government control and
is subject to numerous political interests.
Part IV will argue that continued federal sup-
port for public broadcasting is constitutionally un-
sound under the First Amendment and the con-
flicting Supreme Court decisions thereunder. Part
V will discuss the executive branch's controls and
censorship pressures, linked to the annual appro-
priation, exerted on public broadcasting. Part VI
will examine the American public's reaction to
and support for public broadcasting. Part VII will
propose alternative methods for phasing out the
annual federal appropriation and determine
whether these methods present recurring legal
and constitutional issues or instead better achieve
a goal of adequately financed, noncommercial
broadcasting benefiting all the American people.
Furthermore, this comment will argue that pub-
lic broadcasting has lost sight of the mission the
Johnson Administration originally intended for it.
As a result, public broadcasting no longer con-
forms to constitutional standards of accountabil-
16 Public Broadcasting Donor Privacy Act, H.R. 2791,
106th Cong. (1999).
17 See CPB Announces New Guidelines to Protect Privacy of
Public Broadcasting Contributors: Stations Not Allowed to Share
Lists with Political Campaigns or Committees, Corp. for Pub.
Broadcasting press release, July 30, 1999 [hereinafter CPB
Press Release]. CPB press releases and memoranda can be
found at its web page archives. See Corporation for Public
Broadcasting (visited Jan. 24, 1999) <www.cpb.orgatwork/
media>.
IS See CPB Press Release, supra note 17.
19 See Memorandum from Bob Coonrod, President &
CEO, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, to Public Radio
and Television Station General Managers (July 28, 1999).
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ity, it is not in alignment with First Amendment
rights and it has not generated a favorable re-
sponse from the American public. This comment
will conclude that, given these circumstances,
there is little justification for direct annual federal
subsidies for public broadcasting. Federal support
of public broadcasting has produced results that
reflect neither the intent of the 90th Congress,
which drafted the bill, nor the Johnson Adminis-
tration, which signed it into law.
2 0
I. HISTORY BEHIND THE ACT AND
FORMATION OF THE CORPORATION
1951 marked the advent of noncommercial tel-
evision, when the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC") set aside 80 VHF and 162 UHF
channels for educational purposes. 21 The idea
gained momentum in 1961, when FCC Chairman
Newton Minnow-who regarded commercial tele-
vision as a "vast wasteland"-pledged his support
for educational television.22 In the year that fol-
lowed, the Kennedy Administration passed the
Educational Television Facilities Act,23 which pro-
vided federal funding for new television stations.
That same year brought passage of the All-Chan-
nel Receiver Act,24 which required all newly built
television sets to carry the UHF channels where
most educational programming appeared.
2 5
20 See George F. Will, Who Needs Public Broadcasting, WASI-H.
POST, Aug. 1, 1999, at B7. George F. Will is an ABC News
commentator and panelist on This Week with Sam Donaldson
& Cokie Roberts. In addition, he is the author of a syndicated
news column that appears in over 450 newspapers and is the
1977 recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for commentary. See ABC
News, George Will (visited Oct. 9, 1999) <abcnews.go.com/
onair/thisweek/html_files/willg.html>.
21 In re Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C.
148, 158-73, paras. 33-84 (1952) (referencing the FCC's
Sixth Report and Order on amendment of the Commission's
rules, regulations, and engineering standards concerning tel-
evision broadcast service); see also 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3079-90
(1951).
22 DAVID HOROWITZ & LAURENCE JARVIK, PUBLIC BROAD-
CASTING AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 3 (David Horowitz & Lau-
rence Jarvik eds., Second Thoughts Books 1995).
23 Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 390-395 (1994)).
24 All Channel Receiver Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-529,
76 Stat. 150 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303(s)
(1994)).
25 See HOROWITZ & JARVIK, supra note 22, at 3.
26 See RALPH ENGLEMAN, PUBLIC RADIO AND TELEVISION IN
AMERICA: A POLITICAL HIsToRY 87 (1996).
27 See HOROWITZ &JARVIK, supra note 22, at 7.
Under the Johnson Administration, Congress
created a task force on educational television,
known as the Carnegie Commission on Public
Television ("the Commission").2 6 The Commis-
sion recommended a better-financed and di-
rected educational television system than in exist-
ence in the United States at the time.2 7 In
addition, the Commission recommended replac-
ing the term "educational television" with "public
television."28 Congress responded to the Commis-
sion's study by enacting the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967.29
By the middle of the decade, several metropoli-
tan-area stations in New York, Pittsburgh, Boston
and Chicago had begun construction of a public
television network. 30 However, the passage of the
1967 Act gave birth to the CPB.31 The CPB used
its initial $5 million appropriation to arrange in-
terconnection of the 150 educational stations in
operation at the time and began nationwide
broadcasts on January 5, 1969.
3 2
The 1967 Act required the CPB to make its
budgetary requests directly to Congress, because
it was not an agency or an establishment of the
government. 3 The CPB budget is now funded by
an annual appropriation from the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the House Committee on Com-
merce. 34 Notably, CPB enjoys greater autonomy
28 See id. The change in terminology arose for public re-
lations reasons and to prevent the misinterpretation that
public television would be limited solely to instructional pro-
gramming. See Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Gov-
ernment's Role in Public Broadcasting, 46 FED. COMM. LJ. 491,
498 (1994).
29 S. Res. 1160, 90th Cong., 113 CONG. REC. 26417-18
(1967) (enacted).
30 See Television Stations in the United States, I BROADCAST-
ING & CABLE Y.B. (Harry Jessell & Mark K. Miller eds., R.R.
Bowker 1995) at C-52, C-65, C-36, C-24-25. WNET, WQED,
WGBH and WTTW were the first noncommercial television
stations with the aim of airing educational programming and
pioneered the public broadcasting network. See id. WNET in
New York first went on the air on January 2, 1948, WQED in
Pittsburgh went on the air on April 1, 1954, WGBH-TV in
Boston went on the air on May 2, 1955, and WTTW in Chi-
cago went to air that same year on September 6. See id.
31 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (authorizing the "establishment
of a nonprofit corporation, to be known as the 'Corporation
for Public Broadcasting,' which will not be an agency or es-
tablishment of the United States Government").
32 See LAURENCE JARVIK, PBS: BEHIND THE SCREEN 22
(1997).
33 47 U.S.C. § 396 (k)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
34 See Corporation for Public Broadcasting Authorization
Act of 1999, H.R. 2384, 106th Cong (1999).
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than any federal agency-or even most govern-
ment corporations-because the Johnson Admin-
istration established a trust fund for the CPB in
the United States Treasury, which allows funds to
be advanced to the CPB directly from the Treas-
ury. 
3 5
Yet, as will be demonstrated, public broadcast-
ing has hardly been immune to outside political
influences and special interests, as was intended."!
Ironically, public broadcasting fails to meet the
true goals of educating and bringing cultural pro-
gramming to the American people because of the
direct funding of the CPB. Rather, this scheme
has engendered intense lobbying of Congress and
severe political infighting.
3 7
II. PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE
POLITICAL ARENA
In creating CPB, Congress maintained that it
was "in the public interest to encourage the
growth and development of public radio and tele-
vision broadcasting, including the use of such me-
dia for instructional, educational, and cultural
purposes."3 8 Because public broadcasting was to
be "carefully guarded from government or party
control, '"9 CPB was endowed with a "nonprofit
and nonpolitical nature."40 Furthermore, CPB was
prohibited from contributing to or supporting
any political party or candidate for elective public
office.
4 1
Although technically prohibited from directly
lobbying or supporting members of Congress,
CPB attempted to do so in 1995 when it was
under heavy scrutiny by the Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich. 42 Gingrich pushed public broad-
casting stations to trim expenses and criticized the
stations for encouraging public television viewers
to contact their representatives when their annual
31 Patricia M. Chuh, The Fate of Public Broadcasting in the
Face of Federal Funding Cuts, 3 COMM LAw CONSPEcrUS 207, 210
(1995).
36 See Behrens, supra note 12; de Moraes, supra note 13;
see also ENGELMAN, supra note 26, at 165-72 .(1996).
37 The following books do an excellent job of capturing
the rather interesting and sometimes frightening political
history behind public broadcasting: ENGELMAN, supra note
26; LAURENCE JARVIK, supra note 32; JAMES LEDBFTrER, MADE
POSSIBLE By... THE DEATH OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES (1997); MICHAEL TRACEY, THE DECLINE OF
PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING (1998).
318 Pub. L. No. 90-129, § 201(6), 81 Stat. 365, 368 (codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
appropriation was under attack by Congress's Re-
publican majority.43-At that time, CPB President
Richard Carlson issued a $250,000 consulting con-
tract to former Republican representative and
lobbyist Vin Weber; Mr. Weber was a close friend
of Gingrich and a co-founder of Gingrich's Con-
servative Opportunity Society. 44 Carlson claimed
that the contract was not for lobbying, but to pro-
vide "strategic advice" on how CPB should deal
with the recent developments in Congress. 45 The
only strategic duty Weber performed under the
contract, however, was dining with Gingrich;
46
CPB's board of directors subsequently rescinded
the contract.
47
Smarting under its mistake, CPB found more
discrete ways to "buy off' its right-wing critics. For
example, former Reagan and Bush speechwriter
Peggy Noonan landed a $100,000 CPB contract to
express her opinions on "the family, faith, and
culture" in a three-part miniseries; another for-
mer Bush speechwriter Tony Snow collected a
$75,000 CPB grant to produce a documentary
called The New Militant Center and he received an
additional $80,000 grant to moderate a two-hour
special focusing on welfare reform.48 In addition,
Snow made regular appearances as a commenta-
tor on National Public Radio; CPB publicists
make it a point to remind journalists that Snow is
"Rush Limbaugh's favorite substitute host."49
While these contracts may be distinguishable
from the Weber contract because Snow and Noo-
nan actually produced content for PBS, they just
as easily can be seen as largesse dispensed by CPB
to dedicated and influential conservatives.
Furthermore, while the award of grants and
contracts has often been a product of politics,
many significant public broadcasting appoint-
ments and decisions have also been purely polit-
39 113 CONG. REC. 31587 (1967).
40 Pub. L. No. 90-129, § 201(6), 81 Stat. 365, 370 (codi-
fied as amended at 47:'U.S.C. § 396(f) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998))
41 See id. at § 396(f) (3).
42 See LEDBE-rrER, supra note 37, at 199.
4"3 See id.
44 141 CONG. REC. H1472-03 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Bonior).
45 See Ledbetter, supra note 37, at 199.
46 George Archibald, CPB Reversal Costs Weber a $250,000
Deal, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at Al.
47 See id.
48 See LEDBE1'IrrER, supra note 37, at 200.
49 Id.
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ical in nature. 50 Even President Johnson secured
for a devoted political aide a position on the Car-
negie Commission, which performed the very
study that recommended the establishment of a
formal public television network. 51 Further exam-
ples abound: Nixon nominee Thomas Curtis
planned much of Nixon's U.S. Senate campaign
while on the CPB Board; Gerald Ford nominated
an active Republican party fundraiser to the CPB
Board, who relayed confidential public opinion
results to Ford about the 1976 presidential cam-
paign; Jimmy Carter nominated candidates that
his own advisors regarded as sub-par as political
favors to some of the more powerful senators of
the time; Ronald Reagan appointed Sonia Lan-
dau, national chair of Women for Reagan-Bush, as
well as Honey Alexander, wife of the former Re-
publican Tennessee governor and presidential
candidate, Lamar Alexander. 52
President Johnson may have envisioned an or-
ganization free of political party influences, but
from the start both major political parties have
transformed it into a platform for their interests.
By making satisfaction of political interests a pri-
mary objective, the organization's laudable aims
of better educating the American people, making
the media more accessible and using broadcasting
media to enhance American culture have been
compromised. The independence from govern-
ment and political party control needed to pro-
mote these aims has not occurred.
Also entering the political arena are groups
that depend on CPB funding, under the auspices
of fighting for children's education. One notable
example is the Children's Television Workshop
("CTW"), producer of Sesame Street and numerous
other public broadcasting programs. , 3 Joan
50 See id. at 9-10.
51 See id. at 9.
52 See id. at 10. Notably, Honey Alexander's resume did
not include any experience or interest in broadcasting what-
soever. See id.
53 SeeJARVIK, supra note 32, at 39. Sesame Street is a chil-
dren's educational program that has aired on PBS for over 30
years. See id. Its producer, Joan Cooney, worked in commer-
cial programming for many years before moving to public
broadcasting. See id. at 38. Cooney made the move after she
determined that there was a need for children's educational
programming. See id.
54 Id. at 46.
55 SeeJARVK, supra note 32, at 47.
56 These tactics were common despite President John-
son's past assurances that public broadcasting would be free
of any government or party control. See id.
Cooney, producer of Sesame Street, claimed that
while no television program could completely
bridge the gap in education between children of
different income levels, she hoped that Sesame
Street and other programs created by CTW could
"move all children across the basic literary line,
which is key to education and later entering the
mainstream of American life." 54 Although this is a
praiseworthy goal, CTW has employed some dubi-
ous tactics.
CTW has worked hard to protect its objective of
educating children, possibly to the point of risk-
ing its tax-exempt status as a nonprofit corpora-
tion.55 Because CTW believed the government
was in control of public television, it spent a large
sum to protect its interests in Congress. 56 For ex-
ample, CTW in 1989 reported spending approxi-
mately $4 million annually on lobbying. 57 It was
not apparent that CTW had so heavily lobbied
Congress until 1992, when Senator Robert Dole
placed CTW's tax filings under heavy scrutiny.58
To avoid facing such scrutiny in the future, CTW
hid most of its lobbying expenditures by splitting
them into different categories; it is unknown what
sum is spent on the activity today.
59
Had it engaged in these actions today, CTW-a
nonprofit organization exempt from federal taxa-
tion-would be in violation of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, which restricts corporations organized
and operated for educational purposes from in-
fluencing legislation.60 CPB, which identifies itself
as a District of Columbia nonprofit corporation,
seems to fall squarely under this restriction.'-,
More recent events also threaten the tax-ex-
empt status of public broadcasting and could lead
to possible violations of the 1967 Act. America's




60 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). This part of the U.S.
Code concerns organizations that are exempt from federal
taxation, which includes "[c]orporations and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclu-
sively for ... educational purposes ... no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or other-
wise attempting, to influence legislation."
61 See CPB ANNUAL REPORT', supra note 13, at 22-33. CPB
prides itself as an organization that supports education, as is
apparent from the highlights of projects funded in the an-
nual report. See id. at 22-23. As a result, attempting to influ-
ence legislation could threaten its tax-exempt status as a non-
profit corporation.
62 America's Public Television Stations ("APTS") serves
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tional Public Radio ("NPR")63' and the Public
Broadcasting System ("PBS") 64 have discussed the
possible formation of a "Grand Alliance" of public
broadcasters, in which they would join forces by
sharing program development, backroom opera-
tions and lobbying functions under a combined
budget of $650 million. 65 Joining forces with
other organizations that are not necessarily pro-
hibited from lobbying, supporting political candi-
dates or influencing legislation could be a danger-
ous move for CPB; this involvement could also
violate the terms of its establishment under the
1967 Act.66
III. CONFLICTING VIEWS BETWEEN THE
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
BRANCHES ON CPB'S STATUS AS A
GOVERNMENT CORPORATION
Since its formation in 1967, CPB's status as a
as a lobbying and trade organization for public television sta-
tions around the country; it can do so because it is not en-
gaged in any educational or programming functions. See The
Association of America's Public Television Stations (visited Nov.
28, 1999) <www.apts.org>.
63 National Public Radio serves as a national network for
public radio programming, producing and distributing it to
noncommercial stations around the country. See NPR Online
(visited Oct. 19, 1999) <www.npr.org>.
64 The Public Broadcasting System, designed to provide
interconnection services for member stations, serves as a
"quasi-network" for public television programming. See EN-
GELMAN, supra note 26, at 169, 170. PBS is responsible for
approving and distributing programs that appear on public
television. See id. Although CPB distributes a rather substan-
tial grant to the organization each year, unlike CPB, PBS re-
ceives no direct appropriations from the federal government.
See id. Much of its funding comes from the interconnection
and membership fees of the public television stations as well
as some private support. See id.
65 See Public Broadcasters Weighing Creating 'Grand Alliance,'
PUB. BROADCASTING REP., Mar. 12, 1999, at 2.
66 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(f) (1994).
67 The General Accounting Office ("GAO") completed a
report in 1995 profiling 27 government corporations. See
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CORPORA-
TIONS-PROFILES OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 GAO REPORT]. The report mainly
looked at the reported identities (legal authority & status,
objectives, budget sizes, etc.) of the various government cor-
porations and their adherence to 15 selected federal statutes
applying to the various agencies and departments of the fed-
eral government. See id. The report was compiled by survey-
ing 58 possible government corporations, including the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting. See id. Even though CPB
claimed that it was not a government corporation, it was in-
cluded in the profile because it has been identified in several
major government corporation studies over the past 15 years
and receives most of its operating expenditures from yearly
government entity remains an unresolved issue,
much like the regulations to which CPB is subject.
While the Government Accounting Office
("GAO") considers CPB a government-sponsored
corporation, 67 the management and board of
CPB report it as a private "District of Columbia
not-for-profit corporation authorized to receive
federal appropriations under Title II of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967."68 According to the
present annual budget of CPB, approximately 90
percent of its "support and revenues" derives
from federal appropriations. 69
The GAO defines government-sponsored cor-
porations as "generally federal chartered entities
created to serve a public function of a predomi-
nantly business nature. " 7 0 CPB was chartered by
an act of Congress, 71 it serves a public function
72
and its work is of a predominantly business na-
ture.7 - In drafting the Government Corporation
Control Act7 4 ("GCCA"), Congress defined "Gov-
federal appropriations. Because CPB claimed it was not a
government corporation, the management of CPB ignored
the part of the survey dealing with adherence to federal stat-
utes. See id. at app. VI. Yet Table VI.I.1. of the report indi-
cates that the federal government was CPB's sole source of
funding from 1990 to 1994. See id. It is not entirely clear how
one determines the difference between a "government cor-
poration," subject to the provisions of the Government Cor-
poration Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9101 et seq., and a "private
corporation authorized to receive federal appropriations."
See id.
68 See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 40.
69 See id. at 38. CPB received $250 million as its general
federal appropriation in 1998. See id. It received another $7.5
million to fund a satellite replacement project, passed on di-
rectly to PBS and NPR. See id. at 43. Together, these
amounted to over 90 percent of CPB's annual budget, the
remainder coming from interest income' on its bond portfo-
lio, grants and contracts, royalties, refunds from portions of
unused grants and contracts and an annual payment coming
from a specially restricted grant. See id. at 38.
70 1995 GAO REPORr, supra note 67, at 1.
71 See 113 CONG. REC. 31587 (1967); see also Public Broad-
casting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
72 Its function is to "facilitate the full development of
public telecommunications [through] programs of high
quality[.]" See 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at app. VI.
73 According to its annual report, CPB's main activities
include the funding of national television and radio pro-
gramming, funding individual television and radio stations to
produce new and original programming, providing grants to
assist television and radio stations in becoming more self-suf-
ficient and less dependent on tax dollars and providing spe-
cial grants to support educational activities and produce edu-
cational materials. See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at
43-44. See also 47 U.S.C. § 39 6 (g) (explaining the purposes
and activities of CPB).
74 31 U.S.C. § 9101-10 (1994).
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ernment Corporation" as "a mixed-ownership
Government corporation and a wholly owned
Government corporation. ' 75 The GCCA proceeds
to define "mixed-ownership Government corpora-
tion" and "wholly owned Government corpora-
tion," but CPB does not appear on either list,
which reinforces CPB's own self-reporting as a pri-
vate nonprofit corporation.
76
Apparently, Congress and the executive branch
(of which the GAO is a part)77 do not exactly con-
cur on CPB's status as a federally-funded entity.
However, there are few other federally funded en-
tities that exist under an arrangement similar to
CPB's. 78 No other federally funded entity fails to
acknowledge at least some necessity for adher-
ence to the federal statutes that apply to various
departments, agencies and corporations of the
federal government.79 Although its funding is
mostly controlled by Congress and its Board of Di-
rectors is appointed by the President, 0 CPB
somehow manages to avoid adhering to federal
laws that apply to other entities like it, perhaps be-
cause its status as an entity remains unresolved.8'
CPB's ambiguous status makes First Amendment
questions regarding its program funding difficult
to answer.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS AND
CONFLICTING SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
Although Congress desired to establish a pro-
gram funding agency that would be free from gov-
75 Id. at § 9101 (1).
76 See id. at §§ 9101(2) & 9101(3).
77 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 13,
42 Stat. 20 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)).
78 See 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at app. VI (con-
tamining the supplementary report "Profiles of Other Federally
Funded Entities"). The other entities profiled are the Inter-
American Foundation ("IAF"), Legal Services Corporation
("LSC"), Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation ("NRC")
and the U.S. Postal Service ("USPS"). See id. Of these entities,
CPB was the only one that claimed it was a completely private
corporation with no real federal affiliation, and it would not
answer the part of the GAO's survey on adherence to federal
statutes. See id. IAF reported itself as an "executive agency
with a corporate form" LSC reported as a "private, nonprofit,
non-membership corporation," NRC reported as a "non-
profit, public corporation" and USPS reported as an "in-
dependent establishment of the executive branch of U.S.
government." See id. These other four entities reported their
degree of adherence to the selected 15 federal statutes in the
survey. See id.
79 The 1995 GAO Report surveyed federal entity adher-
ernmental influence or control in its operations,
lawmakers feared that complete autonomy might
lead to biases and abuses of its own as an organiza-
tion and did not want it completely separate from
the government.82 This has created an apparent
conflict between federal decisions concerning
First Amendment rights and those involving
CPB.83
In creating CPB, Congress recognized that "the
encouragement and support of public telecom-
munications, while matters of importance for pri-
vate and local development, are also of appropri-
ate and important concern to the Federal
Government."84 However, when the federal gov-
ernment involves itself in mass communication,
First Amendment concerns are implicated. If CPB
denies a grant to a television station, radio station
or prospective program producer, is this a govern-
mental prior restraint of free speech?
Past court decisions and current laws have con-
flicted on this issue. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v.
FC03 5 involved a complaint over two PBS pro-
grams, one dealing with sex education and the
other with criminal justice. The court determined
that Congress reserved oversight responsibility for
CPB by controlling its purse strings and by imple-
menting statutory safeguards to deter "partisan
abuses."8' 6  The court deemed section
396(g) (1) (A) of the 1967 Act "a guide to Congres-
sional oversight policy," because it authorized
CPB "to facilitate the full development of educa-
tional broadcasting . . . with strict adherence to
objectivity and balance. 8- 7 The First Amendment
ence to some of the following federal statutes: Privacy Act of
1974, Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Anti-Deficiency
Act, Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 and Gov-
ernment Performance and Results Act of 1993. See id. at app.
VI.
80 See 47 U.S.C § 396(c) (1) & (k)(l) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
81 NancyJ. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of
Institutional Choice and Government Created Charitable Organiza-
tions, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 945, 999 n.66 (1997).
82 See H.R. REP. No. 90-572, at 19 (1967), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1772, 1810.
83 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances").
84 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (4) (1994).
85 521 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
86 See Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. F.C.C., 521 F.2d at 294.
87 Id. at 290.
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provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press[.] ' 88 Yet somehow CPB is able to oversee a
form of speech and mandate that it strictly adhere
to "objectivity" and "balance."8 9
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion,9° the Supreme Court held that a government
corporation created by special law is, for purposes
of First Amendment analysis, part of the federal
government to the extent it is created to advance
governmental goals and the government retains
permanent authority to appoint a majority of di-
rectors. 91 This decision may be applicable to
CPB's functioning as a government organization
and may resolve the First Amendment issue. The
holding of this case suggests that CPB is part of
the federal government to determine where it can
exercise its First Amendment rights, because a
special law created CPB to advance governmental
goals,92 and the federal government appoints all
of its directors.93 This holding may work for other
government and government-sponsored corpora-
tions, but it may not be in the interests of an or-
ganization that was intended to fund educational
broadcasting for the American public-Congress
and President Johnson wanted to establish an or-
ganization that would not be restrained by gov-
ernment or party control.94
Together, the Lebron and Accuracy in Media deci-
sions suggest that the government may regulate
the programming funded by CPB to the point
where the programs are strictly objective, even
though CPB was originally intended to be free of
88 U.S. CONST. amend. I
89 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g) (1) (A) (1994) (stating that the
Corporation is authorized to require "strict adherence to ob-
jectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of
a controversial nature").
90 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
91 See Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. at 400.
92 Pub. L. No. 90-129, § 201(6), 81 Stat. 365, 369 (codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
93 See id. at § 396(c)(1).
94 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(b)&(c) (1994).
95 See 113 CONG. REC. 31587; see also Pub. L. No. 90-129,
§ 201(6), 81 Stat. 365, 368 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 396(b) (1994)) (establishing CPB as a nonprofit corpora-
tion, not an agency or department of the United States gov-
ernment).
96 See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
see also Cone v. Caldera, 46 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1999).
97 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
98 See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994) (maintaining that no non-
government control.95 However, the standard for
what is "objective" and "balanced" appears to be
an arbitrary one, and may present problems for
public broadcasting. 916
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,
97
the Court struck down as a blatant violation of the
right to free speech a section of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 forbidding any CPB-funded non-
commercial educational broadcast ("NCE") sta-
tion from "editorializing" about political
candidates.98 Although the court acknowledged
that Congress possessed Commerce Clause99
power to "regulate the use of broadcast communi-
cation," and "assure that the public receives
through this medium a balanced presentation of
information and views on issues of public impor-
tance . . . ,".10 it found that the prohibition
against editorializing was a risk to the freedom of
public broadcasting. Therefore, claiming that an
issue is of "public importance" and "assuring a
balanced presentation of information," Congress
could enact unconstitutional regulation of public
broadcasting. What can be considered of public
importance and what is a balanced presentation
are both subjective and not for Congress to deter-
mine. But as long as stations and programs are re-
ceiving CPB grants funded by federal appropria-
tions, Congress will be able to use this outlet to do
so. The courts remain in conflict on the issue of
whether the federal government is really in con-
trol of CPB or if it is "free from government con-
trol" as President Johnson and the 90th Congress
envisioned.10
commercial educational broadcasting station could editorial-
ize or support any candidate for public office). The word "ed-
itorialize" was removed by the Public Telecommunications
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-626, § 10, passed Nov. 7, 1988.
The law now reads that noncommercial educational broad-
casting stations may neither support nor oppose any candi-
date for office. See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994).
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
100 FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468
U.S. 364, 376-77 (1984). This case concerned an owner and
operator of several noncommercial educational broadcasting
stations receiving grants from CPB who brought an action
that challenged the constitutionality of § 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act, which prohibited noncommercial broad-
casters from engaging in editorializing. The plaintiffs
deemed the law as unfairly targeted at noncommercial
broadcasters. See id. It has since been changed, with the only
restriction being that noncommercial educational broadcast-
ers cannot support or oppose any candidate for a political
office. See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994).
10- See 113 CONG. REC. 31587; see also 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)
(1994).
[Vol. 8
Not Quite What LBJ Had in Mind
V. POLITICAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
CONTROL OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING
BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Although CPB may identify itself as a private
corporation with the right to grant or deny funds
to public broadcasters as it sees fit, it is the Presi-
dent who, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, appoints the members of the CPB's board of
directors.10 2 Could the President indirectly influ-
ence what is shown on public television and pub-
lic radio by appointing board members who are
sympathetic to his political party's agenda and in-
terests?
In the past, this is exactly what happened. In
1971, the Nixon administration began an assault
on public broadcasting, believing it to have an
"entirely liberal agenda hostile to his administra-
tion.' 0 3 The White House wanted to end public
television's capacity to function as a strong na-
tional network by moving for a "return to local-
ism." It also expressed concern over the "potential
impact of public affairs programming," which
amounted to more than one-third of the PBS
schedule at the time.
10 4
In response to Nixon's attack, the CPB board
voted against funding news, news analysis and
political commentary, and even proposed a ban
on controversial programming altogether. 105
Shortly after CPB's attempt to appease his Admin-
istration, Nixon vetoed a two-year authorization
bill, causing the CPB president and chairman,
both democratic appointees of Johnson, and sev-
eral other board members to resign in 1972.106
Nixon appointed or re-appointed eleven of the fif-
teen CPB board members, including former Re-
publican Congressman Thomas Curtis and Henry
Loomis, former director of the Voice of America
under Nixon.10 7 The new board voted to discon-
tinue funding for nearly all public affairs pro-
102 47 U.S.C. § 396(c).
103 ENGELMAN, supra note 26, at 168.




108 See ENGELMAN, supra note 26, at 169, 170. PBS, a non-
profit, non-governmental agency receiving no direct federal
tax dollars, has the freedom to accept and reject programs
for broadcast as it sees fit, just like a commercial network. See
id. National Public Radio and Public Radio International
("PRI") are similar organizations that are responsible for
noncommercial radio programming. See id.
109 See id. at 170.
gramming and began exerting greater control
over PBS,108 reducing it to a narrowly technical
role of operating the interconnection of sta-
tions. 0 9
. The Carter administration made a complete
shift.110 A majority of the CPB board handpicked
by Carter voted to stop making specific program
recommendations and also established a semiau-
tonomous Program Fund that protected the pro-
gram selection process from outside influences
(including the board members themselves)."'
Yet censorship pressure still emanated from the
White House and Congress. For example, acting
Secretary of State Warren Christopher intensely
pressured PBS to cancel a program about the true
story of the execution of a Saudi princess at a time
when the Carter administration was trying to im-
prove relations with Middle East oil exporters."
12
Although the administration threatened no out-
right penalties against CPB, PBS or the individual
stations, most major metropolitan stations did not
air the program.13
It seems that there has never been a time in
public broadcasting's history when the federal
government has not exerted control in some
form. As long as Congress controls the annual ap-
propriation for CPB, the federal government will
always have some influence over what is broad-
cast. Indeed, staffers in the House of Representa-
tives Committee on Commerce 14 have asserted
that public broadcasting cannot be free of federal
control while it continues to receive federal dol-
lars. 115 Whether it is oversight by congressional
purse strings, or the executive branch's appoint-
ment of the board of directors that impacts broad-
cast content, First Amendment issues will always
arise when federal leaders demand accountability
for tax dollars spent on public broadcasting."
16
Public broadcasting will always be expected to an-
110 See id. at 173. President Ford was mostly indifferent to
public broadcasting. See id.
S11 See id.
112 See id. at 174.
113 See id. at 174.
114 See Corporation for Public Broadcasting Authoriza-
tion Act of 1999, H.R. 2384, 106th Cong. (1999). The House
Committee on Commerce controls the annual appropriation
for CPB. See id.
115 Interview with Linda Bloss-Baum, Counsel to the
House of Representatives Committee on Commerce, in




swer in some way to those who finance it. With
federal appropriations accounting for approxi-
mately seventeen percent of public broadcasting's
overall support and ninety percent of CPB's an-
nual budget,11 7 CPB will continue to answer to
the federal regulators, despite a number of laws
recently passed to reduce federal control.
However, this scheme runs counter to the First
Amendment. It is not what President Johnson had
in mind when he approved the first funding for
public broadcasting, because he intended public
broadcasting to be carefully insulated from gov-
ernment control.""8 Furthermore, congressional
intent that CPB be a private and nonpolitical or-
ganization separate from the federal government
has not been satisfied; it never will be as long as
Congress retains control over the purse strings for
CPB funding and responsibility for oversight of
the organization.1 19
VI. PUBLIC BROADCASTING BELONGS TO
"ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?"
President Johnson wanted public broadcasting
to belong to "all the American people" and satisfy
our "appetite for excellence."'21 While public
broadcasting continually prides itself on being a
noble display of American culture in the vast
wasteland of commercial television, few people in
this country seem to notice it. Public broadcasters
might like to claim they reach 120 million Ameri-
cans (and sometimes as many as 200 million), but
this figure includes anyone who has viewed or lis-
tened for only 15 or 20 minutes per week. 121 In
reality, audiences of public television have been
rather small. During the early 1980s, the average
prime time rating for public television ranged
from a market share of 2.6 to 2.8 percent. In-
117 See Public Broadcasting Total Revenues 1982-1997 (last
modified Apr. 3, 1999) <www.current.org/moincn.html>
[hereinafter Public Broadcasting Policy Base charts]. Fund-
ing from CPB grants and distributions accounts for about
16.7 percent of public broadcasting support, while the rest
comes from state and local governments, university funding,
foundation grants and private donations from on-air mem-
bership drives. See id. The annual appropriation from Con-
gress makes up about 90 percent of CPB's annual budget; the
rest comes from royalties, interest income, grants and deobli-
gated project funding. See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
13, at 38.
118 See 113 CONG. REC. 31587 (1967).
119 See Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 294
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
120 113 CONG. REC. 31587 (1967).
creased competition from additional basic and
pay cable stations further eroded this share into
the 1980s and 1990s.1
22
In all households that have access to televi-
sion-including those without any cable service at
all (whose only choices are commercial networks
or noncommercial television)-public broadcast-
ing's market share currently hovers at around
three percent, while there has been a near
tripling of basic cable network market share in
the past decade. 123 Among households that sub-
scribe to expanded cable service (additional chan-
nels beyond basic service), public television mar-
ket share now stands at just two percent of
audiences, while the market share of cable net-
works in this category has more than doubled
over the past decade.' 24 It is estimated that nearly
ninety-eight percent of all American households
own a television, and over sixty percent subscribe
to cable service, yet public television has captured
market shares of just three percent and two per-
cent of these groups, respectively. 125
Worse yet, public broadcasters admit that they
can only count ten percent of their regular audi-
ence as contributing members, suggesting little
support from the people claiming to support it
most and even less from the American public as a
whole.' 26 In addition, while there are more than
300 public television stations in this country, most
of the programming is produced by production
companies in four major metropolitan markets by
a small number of production companies and ma-
jor public broadcast stations. 127 The small market
share and narrow production base suggests that
public broadcasting is not reflective of America's
diverse culture or an appetite for excellence in
broadcasting.
Although so much of the federal funding for
121 This is a weekly cumulative, counted by the number
of sets in homes reached by public television. See TRACEY,
supra note 37, at 251 (1998).
122 See id.
123 NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, SURVEY OF
VIEWING SHARES FOR BROADCAST YEARS 1987-1998 (visited
Oct. 19, 1999) <www.ntca.com> [hereinafter NCTA Survey].
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See TRACEY, supra note 37, at 251.
127 See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 22-28. The
majority of public broadcasting programming has been pro-
duced in Boston, New York City, Washington and Los Ange-
les, with much of that programming coming from just four
stations: WGBH (Boston), WNET (New York City), WETA
(Washington) and KCET (Los Angeles).
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public broadcasting is concentrated in just a few
areas of the country, state and local tax-based
sources and local private donations represent
larger shares of funding for public broadcast-
ing. 128 Despite the larger base of support from
state governments, local municipalities and pri-
vate sources than from the federal government,
these entities have little influence over what pub-
lic broadcasting produces today and how it is ad-
ministered.
VII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: HOW TO
MAKE UP THE SHORTFALL
Federal funding accounts for only about seven-
teen percent of support for the entire public
broadcasting system; even if federal support were
cut off entirely, public broadcasting would not
leave the airwaves. 129 It is likely that many rural
stations and minority program producers, who de-
pend heavily on federal support, would suffer the
most.130 Therefore, it is important to examine al-
ternative methods. If federal funding could be
128 See Public Broadcasting Policy Base charts, supra note
117. State and local tax-based sources represent more than
28 percent of public broadcast funding today, while private
sources contribute more than half of public broadcast fund-
ing. But private, state and local sources have limited influ-
ence, when viewed in light of past federal influence over pub-
lic broadcasting. See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at
18-28.
129 See id.
130 See generally White, supra note 28.
131 Annual grants to rural television and radio stations
and minority producers do not make up the entire appropri-
ation. See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 46-58. Pub-
lic broadcasting's flagship stations (WNET, WQED, WGBH
and WTTW, see supra note 30) and other stations in major
metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Washington, Chicago, Bos-
ton, New York City, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh) have a
much larger base of potential donors to draw from, with a
higher average income than in rural and minority communi-
ties. See HOROWITZ & JARVIK, supra note 22, at 259. Yet they
collect $22.3 million in annual television operating and pro-
gramming grants, more than $6.9 million in annual radio op-
erating grants and $1.3 million in other system support. See
id. This does not include grants for new and ongoing pro-
gramming, from which the producing stations and produc-
tion companies receive royalties on "spin-off" products (e.g.,
toys, games and t-shirts). See id. Of the 23 new radio programs
that received grants in 1998, more than half were produced
by stations and production companies in major metropolitan
areas; fewer than a third of the grants were received by rural
and minority producers. See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
13, at 22-23. With television, the numbers are even more un-
settling: Nearly three-quarters of the new television programs
receiving grants were produced by stations and production
companies in Los Angeles, Boston, New York and Washing-
ton; only one-quarter of the grants went to rural and minor-
concentrated exclusively on rural stations and mi-
nority programming, it would be much lower.'
3'
However, Congress is due to increase the funding
of CPB for the coming years.1
3
2
Because funding for CPB is increasing, one
strong possibility for replacing the annual con-
gressional appropriation is creating a public trust
or endowment, the interest of which could be
used for public broadcasting. Funds for the en-
dowment could come from a phase-out of the ap-
propriation over time. Although it would take
time to build up a sizeable endowment, it could
be done, with no new tax dollars for public broad-
casting. Congress attempted this type of scheme
with the Public Broadcasting Self-Sufficiency Act
of 1996, introduced during the 104th Congress by
Representative Jack Fields (R-Tex.).' 33 The bill
was rejected in committee, mainly due to con-
cerns that the trust fund it would have established
would not generate enough interest income to re-
place the $250 million federal appropriation CPB
was to receive at that time.1 34 The bill recognized
that public broadcasting existed to (1) "promote
ity producers (there was some overlap in this group). See id.
at 23-26.
132 See Corporation Public Broadcasting Authorization
Act of 1999, H.R. 2384, 106th Cong. (1999). The Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting has usually been forward-funded
when legislation is passed for its appropriation. Requests for
funding for 2000, $300 million, and 2001, $340 million, are
still in debate in committee. See id. An up-to-date status of this
bill is available at <thomas.loc.gov>.
133 See Public Broadcasting Self-Sufficiency Act of 1996,
H.R. 2979, 104th Cong. (1996). This bill "intend[ed] to en-
sure the financial self-sufficiency of public broadcasting" by
phasing out the federal appropriation over a four-year pe-
riod. See id. It allowed expanded underwriting on public tele-
vision and radio, the sale of public broadcast airtime for a fee
(but not for infomercials), the sale of "overlapping" public
television stations (meaning two stations where one reaches
more than 50 percent of the other's market), more indepen-
dence for CPB as a nonprofit corporation and most impor-
tantly the establishment of a trust fund for public broadcast-
ing. See id. The income of the trust fund was to cover the
operational and administrative expenses of CPB, pay for pub-
lic broadcasting system support and provide grants to public
broadcasting stations. See id. Stations serving overlapping
markets would not receive grants totaling more than the
amount the markets would receive if single stations served
them. See id. The trust fund would be financed partly by Con-
gressional appropriations in 1998, 1999 and 2000 and partly
from the sale of public television stations serving overlapping
markets and vacant channels originally reserved for public
television. See id.
134 See CPB Funding Plan Far From Perfect, Public Broadcast-
ers Agree, PUB. BROADCASTING REP., Mar. 8, 1996, at 1. While
the proposed Act would have appropriated $1 billion for the
fund, public broadcasters said this would not generate a suffi-
cient amount of interest income to replace the $250 million
2000]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
the delivery of local public telecommunications
services which advance education, support culture
and foster citizenship for all Americans[;]" (2)
"support 'public broadcasting services for rural
and underserved areas and audiences" and (3)
"preserve and protect the editorial integrity and
independence of educational and cultural pro-
gramming, as well as many other functions that
serve the public interest."'13 5
This method of funding may receive renewed
interest in Congress in light of recent events con-
cerning the trading of donor lists by member sta-
tions.' 36 As it stands, CPB has a large portion of its
assets invested in U.S. treasury bills, federal
agency discount notes and commercial paper;
these could be used to build the trust fund.13 7
Another possibility to fund the appropriation is
a tax on cable television bills. Users of residential
and business telephone lines already pay a tax to
support rural telephone service; 138 the same
could be done with public broadcasting. The esti-
mated 67 million users of cable television 139 could
more than make up the $300 million congres-
sional appropriation for 199914 by paying an ad-
ditional $6 per year on their cable bills (or just 50
cents per month). This could also leave enough
left over to contribute to an annual trust fund,
should Congress once again desire self-sufficient
public broadcasting. This method places the bur-
den of supporting public broadcasting on those
who might actually use it and benefit from it, in-
stead of placing the burden on all taxpayers.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a nondis-
criminatory taxing measure which "operates to
defray the cost of a federal program by recovering
federal appropriation. See id. They proposed a $4 billion trust
fund, but sponsors of the bill regarded that amount as far
more than Congress should appropriate for the bill's pur-
poses. See id.
135 Public Broadcasting Self-Sufficiency Act of 1996,
§ 121(b). Besides preserving many of the functions served by
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the bill sought
greater independence for CPB as a District of Columbia Non-
profit Corporation, organized under section 29-1001 of the
D.C. Code, and to "have the usual powers conferred on a
nonprofit corporation by such Act." Id.
136 See Farhi, supra note 10, at Cl; see also Will, supra note
10, at C7.
137 See CPB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 37. CPB
received nearly $12 million in interest income from a portfo-
lio of well over $137 million in cash and cash equivalent
holdings in 1998. This is an average interest rate of almost
nine percent, an excellent return for a low-risk portfolio. If
a fair approximation of cost share of each benefi-
ciary, including states, is not offensive to the con-
stitutional scheme." 141 A federal court has also
ruled that taxes for public services assessed di-
rectly against the users of the services, or "user
fees," do not violate equal protection and due
process guarantees of the United States Constitu-
tion. 142 In addition, public broadcasting funding
would become a form of non-discretionary spend-
ing, such as Social Security, Medicaid or rural tele-
phone service. It would become more difficult for
Congress or the executive branch to exercise the
type of control that has been exercised in the past
under the premise that funding could be discon-
tinued.
Special tax incentives could be provided for do-
nations to public broadcasting in light of the
phase-out of federal support. As it stands, dona-
tions to public television and radio are tax deduct-
ible. Special tax incentives now exist for IRA con-
tributions (which can be deducted above your
normal standard or itemized deductions) 143 and
educational tuition expenses (which can be
credited against a tax bill up to $1000). 144 Similar
tax incentives for donations to public broadcast-
ing would make such support a more personal de-
cision for the American citizen. And such a pro-
gram would be effective, as evidenced by the fact
that many Americans already choose to support
or not support the sponsors of commercial pro-
gramming through their purchasing decisions. If
public broadcasting truly belongs to all the Ameri-
can people as Johnson intended it to, then the
fate of it should be placed more directly in their
hands.
this return could be received on a trust fund of $3 billion, the
income would amount to nearly $270 million, more than the
1998 Congressional appropriation. See id. at 38.
138 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Ser-
vice, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776 (1997).
139 See NCTA Survey, supra note 123.
140 See Corporation for Public Broadcasting Authoriza-
tion Act of 1999, H.R. 2384, 106th Cong. (1999).
141 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978)
(concerning the assessment of' user-based fees on state air-
craft that used a federal airport).
142 See Hotel Employers Ass'n of San Francisco v. Gor-
such, 669 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982) (hotel employees associa-
tion brought suit against the Environmental Protection
Agency for its approval of a system of sewer service charges
adopted by a city and county in California).
143 26 U.S.C. § 219 (1994).
144 26 U.S.C. § 25A (1994).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Public broadcasting is neither independent nor
free of party or political control, given the history
of control exercised by both Congress and execu-
tive branches and demonstrated by recent events
regarding list-swapping with political parties. It
does not belong to all the American people, given
its small market share and past control by federal
officials and broadcasters in major markets. As
long as there is federal support for public broad-
casting, First Amendment implications will always
be a concern because the federal government will
attempt to assert any control, using the funding as
justification. Thus, the federal government can-
not support public broadcasting through annual
appropriations in a way that is constitutionally
sound, and will not achieve the goals that Presi-
dent Johnson intended for it. The federal govern-
ment should exit the broadcasting business and
discontinue direct funding of public broadcast-
ing. Federal funding could be replaced through a
trust fund, user taxes on cable bills or more pri-
vate donations facilitated by the appropriate tax
incentives. This would allow the government to
grant public broadcasting the independence from
political and party control that Johnson and the
90th Congress envisioned.
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